An empirical analysis of the pricing of bank issued options versus options exchange options by ter Horst, Jenke & Veld, Chris
An Empirical Analysis of the Pricing of Bank
Issued Options versus Options Exchange
Options
Jenke ter Horst1 and Chris Veld2
March 1, 2006
JEL codes : G13 and G14
keywords: financial marketing, framing, bank-issued options,
long-term call options, call warrants
1
Corresponding author. Jenke ter Horst is an Associate Professor of Finance at the
Department of Finance, CentER and Netspar at Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153,
NL-5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands. Tel: +31 134668211; fax: +31 134662875;
email J.R.terHorst@uvt.nl. Part of the research for this project was done while Jenke
ter Horst was visiting the Robert H. Smith Business School (University of Maryland).
2
Chris Veld is an Associate Professor of Finance in the Faculty of Business Admin-
istration at Simon Fraser University; email: cveld@sfu.ca. Part of the research of this
project was done while Chris Veld was affiliated with Tilburg University and while he
was visiting the Schulich School of Business (York University).
Abstract
Since 1998, large investment banks have become active as issuers of options,
generally referred to as call warrants or bank-issued options. This has led to
an interesting situation in the Netherlands, where simultaneously call warrants
are traded on the stock exchange, and long-term call options are traded on the
options exchange. Both entitle their holders to buy shares of common stock. We
start with a direct comparison between call warrants and call options, written
on the same stock and with the same exercise price, but where the call option
has a longer time to maturity. In 13 out of 16 cases we find that the call warrants
are priced higher, which is a clear violation of basic option pricing rules. In the
second part of the analysis we use option pricing models to compare the pricing
of call warrants and call options. If implied standard deviations from options
are used to price the call warrants, we find that the call warrants are strongly
overpriced during the first five trading days. The average overpricing is between
25 and 30 percent. Only a small part of the overpricing can be explained by
rational arguments such as transaction costs. We suggest that the overvaluation
can be explained by a combination of an active financial marketing by the banks
and the framing effect.
1. Introduction
The end of the 1990s has shown a remarkable development in the international
option markets. Until then the issuance of options was mostly organized by
official options exchanges. From 1998 banks became very active as options is-
suers. This phenomenon was not entirely new. Around 1990 American and
Canadian banks were very active issuers of Nikkei put warrants
1
. In the begin-
ning of the 1990s, Dutch banks also actively issued options on several European
indexes. These were indexes on which no options exchange options were avail-
able
2
. The large scale in which banks started to issue options at the end of the
1990s was especially remarkable. For example, in October 2001 no less than 830
call warrants were outstanding on Euronext Brussels, 1,047 call warrants were
outstanding on Euronext Amsterdam, and even 4,952 on Euronext Paris
3 ,4
.
Furthermore, it was noteworthy that this trend could be witnessed in Europe,
Asia, and Australia, but not in North America
5
.
Bank-issued options are generally issued under the name “call warrants”. It
should be noticed that call warrants are different from the securities that are
traditionally referred to as warrants. The term warrant traditionally refers to
a right issued by a company to buy a certain number of new shares in this
company during a specific period (the exercise period) at a specific price (the
exercise price)
6
. Here lies an important difference with call warrants, since call
warrants are generally issued by large international investment banks. Conse-
quently, call warrants entitle the holder to buy existing shares rather than new
shares. In the remainder of this paper we will refer to the bank-issued options
either by the term “call warrant”, or simply “warrant”. The securities that
are traditionally referred to as warrants will, from now on, be referred to as
“traditional warrants”.
The fact that warrants and call options are outstanding, which in many cases
entitle their holders to buy the same common stocks, automatically leads to the
question whether they carry the same prices. This is especially the case since
the differences between call warrants and call options are marginal. The most
important differences are the fact that the number of contracts is fixed in case of
call warrants, that the credit risk for call warrants is not borne by the clearing
house of the options exchange, and that it is not possible for other parties to
go short in call warrants. Given the fact that these two financial instruments
are almost identical, they should carry the same prices. We test whether this
is really the case. As far as there are price deviations, we also try to find a
possible explanation.
We start by examining whether it is possible to draw conclusions from a
direct comparison of prices of call warrants and call options. Our sample con-
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tains 16 cases where call warrants and call options, written on the same stock,
have the same exercise price, but where the call options have a longer time to
maturity than the call warrants. Since the call warrants and the call options are
both of the American type, simple option pricing rules state that the call op-
tions should have the same or a higher price than the call warrants. The reason
for this is that most of the variables that determine the value of these securities
are the same (exercise price, underlying stock price, volatility, dividend yield,
risk-free interest rate), but that the option can be exercised for a longer period
than the call warrant. Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find that in 13
out of the 16 cases the warrants carry a higher price during most of the research
period that comprises the first five trading days. This gives a first indication
that the warrants are overpriced compared to the options. Unfortunately, such
a direct comparison is not possible for our whole sample. In most cases the
warrants do not only have different maturities from the call options, but also
different exercise prices. Therefore, we also use option pricing models to test
for the price differences. More precisely, we use implied standard deviations
from long-term options to price the warrants. We find that during the first five
trading days, the call warrants are, on average, overpriced by approximately 30
percent. This result holds for all three models that we test, i.e. the model of
Black and Scholes (1973), and the Square Root version of the Constant Elas-
ticity of Variance model of Cox and Ross (1976), both corrected for continuous
dividend payments, and the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979) with dis-
crete dividend payments. Furthermore, we find that 99% of the warrants are
overvalued.
It is not possible to arbitrage the overvaluation away, since it is not possible
to short the warrants
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. However, it still remains remarkable that investors are
willing to pay much more for call warrants than for almost identical call options.
We find that institutional differences, such as transaction costs, at most only
explain a small part of the overpricing. We suggest that the overpricing is
caused by a combination of an active financial marketing by the banks and
framing, as first outlined by Shefrin and Statman (1993). Banks have created a
special image for call warrants through an active marketing. They managed to
frame warrants in such a way that they look like a completely different financial
instrument than call options. In this sense our findings are similar to those of
Cooper et al. (2001). In the period before the bursting of the Internet bubble,
they find a strongly positive stock market reaction to the announcement of
corporate name changes to Internet-related dotcom names. We conclude that
name changes may be important, and, as our study suggests, investors may be
attracted to the name “warrant”.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we shortly
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discuss the development of the market for call warrants. In Section 3 we describe
the data-set, the results of the direct comparison of call option and call warrant
prices, and the methodology for the comparison using option pricing models.
Section 4 contains the results for this comparison. In Section 5 we discuss to
which extent our results can be explained from the institutional differences be-
tween options and warrants. Section 6 contains the results from our discussions
with practitioners and from our searching the practical literature and the fi-
nancial press. The paper concludes with Section 7 in which the summary and
conclusions are presented.
2. Institutional Setting
The history of call warrants in the Netherlands started in 1986 with the issuance
of so-called FALCONS Royal Dutch by Robeco
8
. After this first issue they were
issued under a number of different names in the Netherlands, such as covered
warrants and EAGLES
9
. In the period of 1986 until 1997 only 32 call warrants
were issued in the Netherlands
10
. The issuance of call warrants really took off
in June 1998 with the issuance of a number of call warrants by the German
Commerzbank. The call warrants issued since then have different underlying
values. These include large Dutch stocks, large foreign stocks (e.g., Nokia and
Amazon.com), national and international indexes (e.g., the DAX index and
the Nikkei index), and baskets of stocks. The market for call warrants in the
Netherlands is strongly dominated by a few large banks. For example, according
to the official newspaper of Euronext Amsterdam, De Officiële Prijscourant
van de Effectenbeurs, on November 13, 2001 in total 877 call warrants were
outstanding. Of these call warrants, 94 (11%) were issued by the Dutch ABN
Amro Bank, 85 (10%) were issued by the American Citibank, 291 (33%) were
issued by the German Commerzbank, and 361 (44%) were issued by the French
Société Générale Acceptance. The remaining 46 (5%) call warrants were issued
by a number of smaller parties, mainly other Dutch banks. This underlines the
international character of the market for call warrants.
Despite the large extent of the market for call warrants, there is hardly any
empirical research available on the pricing of these securities. Veld and Verboven
(1995) compare the prices of Dutch equity warrants and long-term call options.
They find that the equity warrants are systematically overpriced compared to
the long-term call options. However, the equity warrants in their comparison
are mostly traditional equity warrants. Only one of the warrants in their sample
was a call warrant as described above. Chan and Pinder (2000) compare the
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pricing of call warrants and call options on the Australian market. They find
that, on average, warrants are 1.30 to 5.02% overpriced to electronically traded
options and that, on average, they are 7.50 to 10.63% overpriced compared
to floor-traded options. From their empirical analysis they conclude that the
overpricing of warrants compared to options can be explained by the liquidity
premium in the warrant market. Bartram and Fehle (2004) compare prices of
call options, traded on the German Eurex market, and call warrants, traded on
the German Euwax market. They find that the warrant ask prices are 4.7%
higher than the option ask prices, and that the warrant bid prices are 9.9%
higher than the option bid prices. They explain this result from a difference in
trading clienteles that differ with respect to the probability of selling the option
back to the dealer/issuer before maturity.
3. Data description and methodology
3.1 Data description
We analyze the prices of call warrants that were issued on Euronext Amsterdam
in the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001. Call warrants are
identified from the Dutch financial newspaper, De Officiële Prijscourant van
de Effectenbeurs, an official publication of, the stock and options exchanges
in Amsterdam. Information on the warrants expiration date, exercise price
and the warrant-ratio (this is the number of warrants that are needed to buy
one share of common stock) is all derived from Datastream. The warrants are
issued by trade. Therefore, there is no explicit issue price for the warrants.
The banks generally publish indicative issue prices; however, these do not bind
them. The actual issue price is the first trading price of the warrants. Warrants
are only included if, during the first 10 trading days, at least five days can be
found on which at least an option with a longer maturity and an option with a
shorter maturity are traded, i.e. have a positive trading volume. The first five
trading days in which an option is available are taken into account. Note that a
trading day is defined as a day on which Datastream reports a positive trading
volume for the warrant. We restrict ourselves to the analysis of call warrants on
individual companies for which there are also long-term call options outstanding
on the options exchange in Amsterdam. In the period from January 1, 1999 to
December 31, 2001, we identify a total of 275 call warrants for which there are
also long-term call options outstanding. Price data are taken from Datastream.
With regard to 35 call warrants, no information is available in Datastream.
Therefore these warrants are eliminated from our sample. The information
on the warrant conditions is also derived from Datastream. This information
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is verified using the original issuance prospectuses of the call warrants. The
latter are available on the website of Euronext Amsterdam (www.aex.nl) and
on the websites of the issuing banks. In five cases we find conflicting information
between Datastream and the issuance prospectuses. Since it is not possible to
retrieve the correct information at the issuance dates, we eliminate these five
observations. This leaves us with 235 observations.
3.2 Results from a direct comparison
We first examine whether it is possible to draw conclusions from a direct com-
parison of prices of call warrants and call options that are written on the same
stock. Our sample of 235 observations contains 16 cases where call warrants and
call options have the same exercise price, but where the options have a longer
maturity than the warrants. According to standard option pricing theory, these
options should at least have the same price as the warrants
11
. The reason for
this is that the options give their holders the same rights as the warrants, but
they can be exercised during a longer time period. We find a violation of this
basic option pricing rule in no less than 13 out of the 16 cases. In all these cases
the call warrants are more expensive than the call options during most of the
first 5 trading days.
Consider for example the call warrants issued by Commerzbank on the stock
of Ahold. The call warrants are issued on August 18, 2000, the exercise date
is August 2, 2002, and the exercise price is € 37. The warrant ratio is 0.10,
which means that 10 call warrants are necessary to buy one share of common
stock. The call warrants were first traded on August 24, 2000, for a price of
€ 0.42 per warrant. This means that the price for a right to buy one share of
Ahold is € 4.20. This price can be compared to the price of a long term call
option on Ahold, traded on the same day, with the same exercise price and with
a maturity until October 18, 2002. Although basic option pricing rules would
predict that the call options would have a higher price than the call warrants,
we find that these call options are only traded at a price of € 3.45. Figure 1
includes a comparison of the prices of these call warrants and call options during
the first 5 trading days.
[Please insert Figure 1 here]
In this figure it can be seen that, during the first 5 trading days, the warrants
are priced higher every day. This is remarkable, given that the option gives the
same rights as the warrants, but for a longer maturity. Unfortunately, a direct
comparison such as this one is not always possible. The reason for this is that in
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most cases, the warrants do not only have different maturities but also different
exercise prices. Therefore we continue our analysis using option pricing models.
3.3 Methodology
The methodology in the remainder of this paper consists of the comparison
of model and market prices on the issuance date, and the immediate period
thereafter, of the call warrants. Previous empirical research on the pricing of
traditional warrants generally concludes that the model of Black and Scholes
(1973) and the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976), both corrected for
dividend payments, are the most suitable models for the pricing of traditional
warrants
12
. Both call warrants and traditional warrants are in fact long-term
call options. For that reason it is likely that the models that are suitable for the
pricing of traditional warrants are also most fit for the pricing of call warrants
13
.
Both the Black and Scholes option pricing model and the Square Root model
are special cases of the Constant Elasticity of Variance model (CEV-model). In
the CEV-model, the price of the underlying common stock is assumed to follow
a constant elasticity of variance process, which has the form:
dS/S = µdt+ δS
(Ψ−2)/2
dZ,
where:
S = price of the underlying stock;
µ = expected rate of return on the stock;
Ψ = elasticity factor;
Z = Wiener process.
The instantaneous standard deviation of the percentage return (or volatility),
σ, is given by the equation:
σ = δS
(Ψ−2)/2
When Ψ equals 2, the volatility is a constant, δ, and the stochastic process
generating returns is a lognormal diffusion process, the process assumed in the
Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing model.
Cox and Ross (1976) drop the assumption of a constant volatility and, in-
stead, focus their attention on the case that: 0 ≤ Ψ < 2. In this case the
volatility decreases as the stock price increases. This inverse relationship can
especially be explained by financial leverage arguments. As the stock price falls,
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the market value of the firm’s debt will also fall because of an increased percep-
tion of bankruptcy. The decrease in the market value of equity will be larger
than the decrease in the market value of debt, which produces a rise in the firm’s
debt-to-equity ratio. This increase in financial leverage causes an increase in the
risk of the equity, which leads to a rise in the stock’s volatility. According to
Beckers (1980), a similar effect can be observed if the firm has almost no debt.
Since every firm faces fixed costs, which have to be met irrespective of its in-
come, a decrease in income will decrease the value of the firm and at the same
time increase its riskiness.
As a special case of the general CEV-model, Cox and Ross (1976) present
the Square Root model. This model has a parameter value Ψ of 1. The formula
for the Square Root model can be derived by substituting the value 1 for the
factor Ψ in the general equation of the CEV-model. This model is called the
Square Root model because it assumes that the volatility is inversely related to
the square root of the stock value.
As mentioned above, we use both the models of Black and Scholes (1973)
and the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976) for the calculation of call
warrant model prices. Given the long maturity of the call warrants we use
dividend corrected versions of both models. Dividends are assumed to be paid
continuously as first derived by Merton (1973). When we refer to the model
of Black and Scholes (1973) or the Square Root model of Cox and Ross (1976)
in the remainder of this paper, we mean the versions of these models that are
corrected for continuous dividend payments. Both the call warrants and the
call options are American. This means that they can be exercised from the
issuance date until the expiration date. Merton (1973) has shown that it can
be rational to exercise an American call option (warrant) before an ex-dividend
date. This effect is not incorporated in the model of Black and Scholes (1973)
and the Square Root model. For this reason we also use the Binomial model of
Cox et al. (1979). In the limit case this model converges into the model of Black
and Scholes (1973). The advantage of the Binomial model is that it allows the
incorporation of discrete dividend payments, thus allowing for the possibility of
early exercise.
3.4 Estimation of the variables
All three models require six variables. The first four variables are the same
for all three models, i.e. (1) the price of the underlying stock (S); (2) the
exercise price (X); (3) the remaining time to maturity (T), and (4) the risk-
free interest rate (r). Variables (1), (2) and (3) can be observed directly. The
fourth variable, the risk-free interest rate, can be approximated as the average
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yield on a government bond with the same maturity as the call warrant. Since
all call warrants have a maturity that is around 2 years, we estimate the risk-
free interest rate as the average yield on government bonds with a maturity of 2
years
14
. In addition, the model of Black and Scholes (1973) and the Square Root
model require the dividend yield. This is also available from Datastream. The
Binomial model requires the discrete dividend payment (D) that will be paid
during its remaining maturity. We estimate the discrete dividend as the last
dividend payment before the first trading date. This discrete dividend is also
obtained from Datastream
15
. The final variable that has to be estimated for all
three models is the standard deviation of the returns on the underlying stocks,
commonly referred to as the volatility. We use the implied standard deviations of
long-term call options that are traded on the same stocks in order to estimate
this variable. There is a problem here, in that usually the maturity and the
exercise price of the call warrants are different from the maturity and the exercise
price of the long-term call options. This causes a problem because the volatility
is different between maturities. Brenner and Subrahmanyam (1988) refer to this
phenomenon as the “term structure of volatility”. Besides that, Hull (2006, page
379-381) notes that volatilities for equity options are different between exercise
prices. In general, the volatility decreases as the exercise price increases. The
volatility used to price a low-exercise price option is significantly higher than
that used to price a high-exercise price option
16
. In order to calculate a useful
volatility, we use a “volatility surface” in the spirit of Hull (2006, page 381-
383). To be more specific, the following equations are used in order to arrive at
a weighted implied volatility of the different options:
shortvol =
|X1−X|
|X2−X1|
∗ imp2 +
|X2−X|
|X2−X1|
∗ imp1
longvol =
|X3−X|
|X4−X3|
∗ imp4 +
|X4−X|
|X4−X3|
∗ imp3
wghtimp =
|T1− T |
|T3− T1|
∗ longvol +
|T3− T |
|T3− T1|
∗ shortvol
where imp1 and imp2 denote the implied volatilities of two call options with
a maturity shorter than the warrant, and imp3 and imp4 denote the implied
volatilities of two call options with a maturity longer than the warrant, X1...X4
are the exercise prices of the respective options, and T1...T4 are the maturities
of the respective options, X is the exercise price of the warrant, T is the maturity
of the warrant, shortvol represents the calculation of the implied volatility of
the short-term options and longvol represents the calculation of the implied
volatility of the long-term options, and wghtimp represents the calculation of
the weighted implied volatility of the two series. Note that warrants are only
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priced if we at least observe one call option with maturity shorter than the
warrant, and one call option with a longer maturity. All of the above mentioned
variables are acquired from Datastream.
3.5 Sample selection
The selection of the final sample is presented in Table 1.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
The research is restricted to call warrants that were issued in the period from
January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2001. Only warrants on underlying shares on
which also long term call options are available are taken into account. In total,
275 call warrants fulfill this condition. As indicated in Section 3.1, we eliminate
35 observations for which no information is available in Datastream, as well as 5
observations for which there is conflicting issuance information. A problem that
may occur is that the option, warrant, and stock markets are not synchronous
on the first trading day of the warrant. In other words, the last trade of the
warrant, the option, and the stock will probably occur at different times. In
order to minimize this problem, we average the difference between the market
and model prices of each warrant for the first five trading days. A trading day
is defined as a day on which the trading volume of the warrant is positive. As
mentioned in Section 3.1, trading days are only taken into account if at least one
call option with a longer maturity and one call option with a shorter maturity
than the warrant are traded, i.e. have a positive trading volume. This leads to
the elimination of 28 observations. Warrants are only included if, during the first
10 trading days, at least five days can be found on which the earlier mentioned
two options are traded. This leads to the elimination of 96 observations. The
final sample consists of 111 observations. It should be noted that four underlying
stocks are not included at all in the final sample. This is mostly caused by the
fact that there is not enough liquidity in the options. Therefore there is not
enough warrant trading days on which options are also being traded.
3.6 Summary statistics
The summary statistics of our sample are presented in Table 2.
[Please insert Table 2 here]
In Table 2 the summary statistics are presented for the different issuers. All
call warrants in our sample are issued by either the Dutch ABN Amro bank
or by one of the following foreign issuers: Citibank, Commerzbank and Société
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Générale Acceptance. ABN Amro bank is referred to as issuer A. The foreign
issuers are indicated as B to D. The average warrant price in Panel A, based
on a warrant-ratio of 0.1, is 0.55. The average maturity of the call warrants is
close to 2 years (1.71 years). The average warrant-ratio is 0.13. On the trading
days, the warrants are actively traded, with an average trading volume of 7,518
warrants and a median of 4,000 warrants. In Panel B, the summary statistics
are presented for the warrants that are priced with four options
17
. The results
in Panel B are largely the same as in Panel A.
4. Results
The overvaluation of each warrant is calculated as:
Overvaluation =
(market price−model price)
model price
∗ 100%
If the outcome of this calculation is smaller than 0, there is of course no
overvaluation, but an undervaluation instead.
The overvaluation is first calculated for the Square Root model of Cox and
Ross (1976). As mentioned before, this model is corrected for continuous div-
idend payments according to the method presented by Merton (1973). The
overvaluation per share is presented in Table 3.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
In Panel A the overvaluation is presented for the whole sample. From this
panel it can be concluded that on average warrants are overvalued by more than
38%. The average overvaluation is significantly different from zero at the 1%-
level. It has to be noticed that the overvaluation is not only statistically but
also economically significant. The pricing of the call warrants is not based on
some historical estimate for the volatility, but is based on the implied volatility
of long-term call options that have similar exercise prices and maturities as
the call warrants. In this context an overpricing of more than 38% is very
remarkable. If we look at the individual underlying stocks, we see that the
overpricing is significantly different from zero at the 1%-level for all stocks for
which at least four observations are available. The median overvaluation from
Panel A is almost 30%. This is also significantly different from zero at the 1%-
level
18
. In total, 110 out of 111 warrants (99%) are overvalued. The total range
runs from an undervaluation of 0.6% to an overvaluation of 153%. The results in
Panel A are partly driven by some large outliers. Some of these may be caused
by the use of less than four options for the pricing of the call warrants. In such
cases, the possibility exists that the warrants are priced using implied standard
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deviations from options that have much higher or much lower exercise prices.
For this reason we present separate results for the warrants that are priced with
four options. These results are included in Panel B. The average overvaluation
in Panel B is somewhat lower, but is still almost 30% (29.92%). The median
overvaluation slightly drops to 27.55%. The average and the median are both
significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. A potential problem with the
analysis in Table 3 is that the sample comprises 111 observations of call warrants
on 15 firms. If there is a firm-effect, the observations are not independent.
In order to test for this we have calculated results for each separate company.
These overpricing results can then be considered independently from each other,
and we calculate the average of the 15 observations. In addition, the standard
deviation of this average is calculated and is reported in the final row of Panel
A and B of Table 3. Using this standard deviation we can conclude that the
average is still significantly different from zero. In other words, our results are
not driven by a firm-effect.
As a further robustness check we have also calculated results for the
model of Black and Scholes (1973), corrected for continuous dividend payments.
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by the use of a continuous
dividend yield, rather than a discrete dividend payment, we have also calculated
the overpricing for the Binomial model of Cox et al. (1979). In these calculations
we include discrete dividend payments in the model. The average overvaluation
for the model of Black and Scholes (1973) is 31.35%. The median overvaluation
for this model is 25.55%. The average and the median are both significantly
different from zero at the 1%-level. The average overvaluation for the Binomial
model is 29.56% with a median of 25.82%
19
. Again, the mean and median are
significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. Just like the Square Root model,
we have also calculated results for these models for the sub-sample of warrants
that are priced with four options. The average overvaluation of the sub-sample
for the model of Black and Scholes becomes 29.71%. For the Binomial model,
the average overvaluation drops to 27.88%
20
.
We have also investigated whether the overpricing of the warrants resembles
the pattern that can be observed at Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). In the
period directly after an IPO, security prices are inflated, which is followed by a
long-run underperformance
21
. We investigate this by studying the overpricing
of the warrants through time. This analysis is included in Figure 2.
[Please insert Figure 2 here]
This figure presents the average overpricing of call warrants during their
maturity. The graph only includes information on warrants that are actually
traded on a certain day. For example, the information on day 50 includes the
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average overpricing of all call warrants that were traded, i.e. for which there was
a positive trading volume, on the 50th day after their issuance. Call warrants
are only taken into account if they fulfill all four of the following conditions:
1. The trading volume of the warrant is positive.
2. There are at least two call options on the same underlying stock that have
a positive trading volume: one with a longer maturity and one with a
shorter maturity.
3. The overpricing is not more than 150%.
4. The price of the call warrant is at least 0.10 euro.
The third condition is included in order to avoid large outliers to determine
the outcome. The reason that we included the fourth condition is that we ob-
served a number of warrant market prices of about 0.10 euro, or sometimes even
smaller, with an overpricing of more than 200%. Including these observations
would lead to a larger overpricing, which would be based on very small warrant
investments. In order to get a more realistic idea of the overpricing, we delete
these observations.
The overpricing of the first five days in this graph appears to be smaller than
the average overpricing on the first five trading days that we find for the Square
Root model (38.25%). The reason for this is that in the previous calculations we
take the first five trading days for each warrant. In some cases the fifth trading
day only occurs 20 days or more after the issue. This explains the difference
between the results in Figure 2 and the earlier reported results.
Figure 2 shows that the average overpricing remains high until at least one
year after the issue. From approximately 450 days the graph shows a downward
trend. However, it should be noticed that the results after one year should be
treated with caution, since the observations in the graph are often based on a
few call warrants. Our results are comparable to the results of Wilkens et al.
(2003) who study German reverse convertibles and discount certificates. They
also find that these instruments are overpriced directly after the issuance date.
However, in their study the overpricing also disappears in time. For reverse
convertibles, the overpricing disappears at the end of the maturity, while for
discount certificates it disappears after 2/3 of the product’s life times
22
.
The disappearance of the overpricing in time somewhat resembles the pattern
of the IPOs. However, two important comments are in order. First, the life span
of a warrant is limited, whereas the life of a share of common stock is not. At
the end of its maturity the value of the warrant is Max[0, S-X]. Therefore,
the overpricing should by definition disappear during the warrant’s maturity.
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Second, during the first five trading days, the bank will practically only serve
as a seller of warrants. After that period, there will likely be cases where the
warrant holders may want to dispose of their warrants. Given that the banks
all maintain markets in their own warrants; they are likely to be buyers in many
cases. Since they are the experts in the pricing of the warrants, the banks are
not likely to overpay. This probably also explains the upward peaks around the
500th day after the issuance.
5. Institutional diﬀerences between call warrants
and call options
5.1 Introduction
In order to explain the differences in prices between call warrants and call op-
tions, we investigate the institutional differences between the instruments. We
first look at whether the overpricing is different between different issuers. Sub-
sequently, we study the possible impact of transaction cost differences between
call warrants and call options. Attention is also paid to the slightly higher flex-
ibility that call warrants offer compared to call options. This is followed by a
discussion of the secondary market characteristics for both instruments. Finally,
we discuss the lack of arbitrage possibilities.
5.2 Diﬀerences in overpricing between issuers
We expected a priori, that the prices of the foreign issuers would be higher than
that of the Dutch issuers, because the foreign parties have to bear more costs
to operate on the Dutch market. This hypothesis is tested in Table 4 where
we perform a regression analysis of the overpricing on each of the three foreign
issuers.
[Please insert Table 4 here]
The regression analysis in Table 4 is carried out for the overpricing for the
Black-Scholes, the Square Root, and the Binomial model. Besides that, we
perform the regression analysis for both the complete samples and the sub-
sample of warrant prices that are calculated with all four options. Given that
the results of this and the following regressions are virtually the same for all
three models, we only present the results for the Square Root model
23
. For both
the complete sample and the sub-sample, we find that the warrants from issuer
C are significantly more overpriced than the warrants of the Dutch issuer. For
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issuers B and D we also find the expected significant coefficient. However, the
coefficients for both issuers are only significant in the regression for the complete
sample. The significance disappears in the regression for the sub-sample.
A priori we also expected that the overpricing would be negatively correlated
to the warrant trading volume, the idea being that a larger batch would be sold
for a lower price. However, the regression analysis in both panels shows that the
reverse relationship is true. The log of the trading volume is positively related
to the overpricing, indicating that a higher trading volume is associated with a
higher overpricing. The relationship is significant for the whole sample, but not
for the sub-sample. Besides the single regressions, we have also run multiple
regressions for all variables together. The results of the multiple regressions are
mostly similar to those of the single regressions. An interesting exception occurs
for the warrant ratio: the multiple regression does not show a significant sign
for this factor in both the whole sample and the sub-sample.
5.3 Transaction costs
According to the Dutch financial newspaper, Het Financieele Dagblad, of Jan-
uary 24, 2002, more than 70% of the warrant buyers consist of individual in-
vestors. For this reason, it may be interesting to look at the differences in
transaction costs between call warrants and call options. It is not possible to
make a direct comparison of the transaction costs. The reason for this is that
they are charged differently for both financial instruments. Transaction costs
for call options are charged per contract. Each contract allows its holder to buy
100 shares of common stock. Transaction costs for warrants are charged in the
same way as for shares. That is, a (small) fixed amount is charged as well as
a percentage of the market value of the order (in Euros). This means that for
call warrants there is no direct relationship with the number of shares that can
be bought. Both for call warrants and for call options, different amounts apply
between orders placed by phone and Internet orders.
The independent Dutch Internet company “Belegger.nl”, compares trans-
action costs for a number of large Dutch banks and brokers. Based on the
information supplied on their web page (per February 19, 2002), we compare
transaction costs between call warrants and call options. The results for this
comparison are included in Table 5.
[Please insert Table 5 here]
The minimum order for which transaction costs for shares and warrants are
presented on this web page is 1,000. This is the basis for our comparison. In
Table 5 we compare transaction costs for four different scenarios. In all scenarios
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we consider call warrants with a warrant ratio of 0.1. That is, 10 call warrants
are needed to buy one share of common stock. We consider four cases: in the
first case the warrant price is 0.1 Euro; in the second case it is 0.20 Euro; in the
third case it is 0.5 Euro; and in the fourth case it is 1 Euro. The results of the
four scenarios are presented on rows 1 to 4 of Table 5. In all cases we present
the average of the transaction costs that are presented on this website for the
eight banks and/or brokers
24
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In the first row we assume that the warrant price is 0.1 Euro. The order
size of 1,000 Euros would allow the warrant investor to buy 10,000 warrants. If
she would like to take a similar position using options, she would have to buy
10 option contracts. In that case, 1,000 shares can also be bought by exercising
the option (10 contracts of 100 shares each). The transaction costs for the
warrants are presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5. The average warrant
transaction costs are 15.6 Euro for phone trade and 12 Euro for Internet trade.
The average transaction costs for buying 10 option contracts are 52.6 Euro for
phone trade (see column (4)), and 42.8 Euro for Internet trade (see column
(5)). With regard to these transaction costs, it has to be noticed that the
actual difference in most cases has to be doubled. Investors first have to buy
the warrants or the options, and if things go well they have to exercise or sell
them. In columns (6) and (7), we present the difference of the transaction costs
of the call warrants and the call options as a percentage of the warrant price.
From Table 5 it can be concluded that the average difference for the phone
trade is 37 Euro (52.6 minus 15.6 Euro). If this amount is expressed in the
price per warrant it is 0.37 Eurocents per warrant. For a round-trip (buy and
sell) the amount is doubled and it is 0.0074 Euro (= 0.74 Eurocents) per call
warrant. In columns (8) and (9) we present the transaction costs as a percentage
of the warrant price. In the first row the difference of 0.0074 Euro is divided
by the warrant price of 0.10 Euro, resulting in a percentage difference of 7.4%.
Based on this case it could be concluded that the difference in transaction costs
between warrants and options is substantial. However, three remarks are in
order. First, it has to be remarked that the difference for Internet trade is only
6.2% per call warrant. Second, it can be noticed that the scenario in the first
row is the most extreme scenario. Third, even the most extreme transaction
cost difference is much smaller than the price difference. Given an average price
difference between 25 and 30 percent, the price difference expressed in the price
per warrant is between 2.5 and 3 Eurocents.
In the second scenario, we assume that the warrant price is 0.20 Euro. The
warrant holder needs 10 warrants to buy one share. Assuming an order size
of 1,000 Euro, the investor would buy 5,000 warrants. A similar position can
be acquired by buying 5 option contracts. In that case, 500 shares can also be
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bought by exercising the option. The transaction costs for the warrants on the
second row are the same as on the first row. The reason for this is that the order
size, which determines the transaction costs, is the same. The transaction costs
for the options decline, since fewer contracts have to be bought (see columns
(4) and (5)). The difference in transaction costs per warrant (for a round-trip),
and as a percentage per warrant, are presented in columns (6)-(7), and (8)-(9)
respectively. The most important conclusion is the difference in transaction
costs, expressed in the price per warrant, declines from 7.4% to 2.5% for phone
trade, and from 6.2% to 2.1% for Internet trade. It is clear that the difference in
transaction costs is much smaller if more realistic warrant prices are considered.
In the third scenario, we assume that the warrant price is 0.50 Euro. The
warrant holder needs two warrants to buy one share. Assuming an order size of
1,000 Euro, the investor would buy 2,000 warrants. A similar position can be
acquired by buying 2 option contracts. The transaction costs for the warrants
remain unchanged. From columns (8) and (9) of the third scenario it can be
concluded that in this case the difference in transaction costs is negligible. The
same conclusion can be reached from the fourth scenario.
Although not reported in this paper, we have also investigated the transac-
tion costs for larger order sizes in order to see whether the difference in trans-
action costs diminishes for larger order sizes. We find that this is not the case.
The difference in transaction costs remains virtually the same
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Even though transaction costs cannot explain the full overpricing of the call
warrants, it is still possible that they explain a part of the overpricing. From
Table 5 it appears that if warrants become more expensive, the difference in
transaction costs diminishes. If transaction costs explain part of the overpric-
ing, then we would expect to find a higher overpricing for cheaper warrants.
Therefore, we should find a negative relationship between the normalized war-
rant price and the overpricing. This hypothesis is tested in Table 4. In this
table we regress the overpricing on the normalized warrant price. We do in-
deed find a significantly negative relationship between overvaluation and the
normalized warrant price. The significantly negative relationship is found for
the whole sample and the sub-sample. However, if the multiple regressions are
considered, we only see a significance at the 10%-level for the whole sample.
If the multiple regression for the sub-sample is considered, we do not see any
significance anymore for the normalized warrant price. An alternative way to
test this hypothesis is by regressing the overvaluation on the moneyness (defined
as the ratio of the stock price and the exercise price). The hypothesis is that
a higher moneyness is associated with a lower overvaluation. This relationship
is confirmed in both the single and the multiple regressions for both the whole
sample and the sub-sample.
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An interesting question is for how many call warrants, the difference in trans-
action costs plays a role at all. As discussed above, the difference in transaction
costs is either negligible or lower for the call warrants that have a trading price
of 0.5 Euro or higher. In Table 2 we have seen that this is also the average war-
rant price. We have divided our sample of 111 observations in warrants with
an average price lower than 0.15 Euro, warrants with an average price between
0.15 and 0.50 Euro, and warrants with an average price of higher than 0.50
Euro. The difference in transaction costs is relevant for the first group (smaller
than 0.15 Euro), somewhat relevant for the second group (between 0.15 and
0.50 Euro), and not at all for the third group (higher than 0.50 Euro). We find
that there are only 7 warrants in group 1, 50 in group 2 and 54 in group 3.
The average overpricing of the warrants in the third group is 25.21% for the
full sample (with a standard deviation of 3.43) and 26.28% for the sub-sample
(with a standard deviation of 5.02) in which the warrant price is based on the
prices of 4 options.
5.4 Flexibility
Another advantage of warrants for individual investors is that it is easier to start
trading warrants than it is to start trading options. In order to trade options it
is necessary to sign a special option agreement with a bank or a broker. This is
not necessary for warrants. Warrants are also more flexible, since they allow an
investor to trade in small amounts. A single option contract entitles its holder to
buy 100 shares. Most warrants that are traded have a warrant-ratio that is lower
than 1. For example, one warrant “Ahold”, mentioned in Section 3.2, entitles
its holder to buy one-tenth of a share. This means that warrants make it easier
to trade in small amounts. Further, a warrant investor has more flexibility.
For example, it is possible for her to buy rights to acquire 150 shares. This is
not possible with options. We test whether this flexibility difference affects the
overpricing. The hypothesis is that more flexibility, i.e. a lower warrant-ratio,
is associated with higher overpricing. In the regressions in Table 4 we find that
expected negative relationship between overpricing and the warrant-ratio.
5.5 Secondary market for options and warrants
A possible consideration in buying options or warrants is the quality of the
secondary market. In Section 2 we have mentioned the paper by Bartram and
Fehle (2004), who find that warrant ask prices and bid prices are respectively
4.7% and 9.9% higher than option ask and bid prices. They attribute this to the
smaller bid-ask spread in warrant markets which makes it easier to sell warrants
in the secondary market. Warrant issuers in the Dutch market also promise to
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maintain a secondary market for their own warrants. They also quote bid and
ask prices for these warrants. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available
records of these bid and ask prices, which makes it impossible to compare them
with those of the options market. However, it is highly unlikely that the bid-ask
spreads in Dutch warrant markets are better than those in options markets.
First of all, the Dutch market for long-term options is very liquid. This market
started in 1986, as a reaction on the issue of FALCONS Royal Dutch by Robeco,
and has been a big success every since. The secondary market for call warrants
is much less liquid, and investors mostly depend on the issuing bank to buy
back their warrants
27
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In order to illustrate this finding, we calculated for the period of the first 10
trading days of the call warrants issued on the stock ABN Amro, the number
of trading days of long-term call options on ABN Amro with the same exercise
price but a longer maturity. In total we have 5 call warrants on ABN Amro with
corresponding call options with a longer maturity but similar exercise price. In
the period of the first 10 trading days of the call warrants, the average number
of trading days of the call options is 42.6. This indicates that the market for
call options is much more liquid than the market for call warrants. This makes
it highly unlikely that the secondary market characteristics are responsible for
the overpricing of the call warrants; it rather looks like the secondary market is
worse for call warrants.
5.6 No possibility for arbitrage
Even though the warrants are overpriced, it is not possible for investors to
directly profit from this. The reason is that it is not possible to write the
warrants and/or go short in them. Therefore, direct arbitrage is not possible.
In this sense the case for call warrants and call options is much like the case
described by Lamont and Thaler (2003). They study equity carve-outs in the
US technology stocks. They find a number of cases in which holders of a share
of company A are expected to receive x shares of company B. Due to short
sale constraints this mispricing is not eliminated through arbitrage. Lamont
and Thaler (2003) argue that the lack of arbitrage possibilities means that the
market is still efficient. However, they argue: “Still, this is market efficiency
with very wrong prices”.
5.7 Smaller standard deviation of warrant prices because
of bank intervention
Another factor that may explain part of the overpricing of the warrants is the
possibility that warrant prices may be more stable, because of the possibility of
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intervention by the issuing banks. If issuing banks would intervene, we would see
a lower standard deviation of warrant prices compared to option prices. In order
to scrutinize this explanation we study the first 100 days after the introduction
date for both warrants and options. During this period we determine all the
options that are used in order to price a warrant. All these option and warrant
prices are normalized to the first price of the options and the warrants. The
next step is to take the standard deviation of these normalized series. This gives
a maximum of 111 standard deviations of the options and the warrants. The
final step is to calculate the average of these series. This leads to the following
results for the warrants and the options:
- warrant: 0.48
- option with lower exercise price and shorter maturity: 0.33
- option with higher exercise price and shorter maturity: 0.34
- option with lower exercise price and longer maturity: 0.25
- option with higher exercise price and longer maturity: 0.25
These results show either that banks hardly intervene, or that, even if they
intervene, the prices of warrants are not more stable than those of options.
Therefore this possible explanation is not likely to play an important role in the
explanation of the overpricing.
6. Discussion
The analysis of the institutional differences in the previous section has not led to
a satisfactory explanation of the overpricing of the warrants compared to almost
identical call options. For this reason we have searched the financial press and
the practitioners’ literature for explanations. On top of this we have also held
interviews with a selected number of practitioners, some of whom are employed
with warrant issuing banks and some who work for other banks.
Both the practitioners and the financial press indicate that call warrants are
strongly overvalued compared to call options
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. These sources also indicate that
this overpricing cannot be explained from the institutional factors discussed be-
fore. With regard to the secondary market it is confirmed that the long-term
call options, which are traded on the options exchange in Amsterdam, are more
liquid than the bank-issued call warrants. Even warrant-issuing banks have to
admit that the bid-ask spreads in the secondary market are smaller for long-
term call options than for call warrants. We have also asked the practitioners
why there are not more banks active in the market for call warrants. In gen-
eral, banks indicate that, even though the profits in the warrant market are
substantial, it is also costly for banks to engage in issuing call warrants. It is
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particularly expensive to maintain a secondary market for call warrants. Fi-
nally, the practitioners confirm the idea that warrants are almost exclusively
bought by individual investors
29
.
The possible explanation that emerges from our talks to practitioners and
our search in the practitioners’ literature is a combination of financial mar-
keting and the framing effect that was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman
(1986). Shefrin and Statman (1993) were the first to present this combination
of arguments. They argue that, because of a framing effect, investors are not
indifferent to the framing of cash flows. According to their paper the success of
covered calls can be attributed to the ability of financial institutions to frame
the cash flows of covered calls in such a way that they are appealing to differ-
ent types of investors. The case that is presented in the underlying paper goes
one step further. Call warrants and call options not only give the same cash
flows, they are almost identical financial instruments. The most important dif-
ference between these financial instruments is their name. Cooper et al. (2001)
documented earlier that a different name might lead to a different price. In the
period before the bursting of the Internet bubble, they find a strongly significant
positive stock price reaction to the announcement of corporate name changes
to Internet-related dotcom names.
In our research we find that almost identical financial instruments are traded
at different prices. The reason for this is most likely that private investors per-
ceive warrants being different from options. For example, the financial newspa-
per Het Financieele Dagblad of March 16, 2001 writes (translated): “New this
year is the large attention for warrants (..). This product, a kind of option, has
the advantage that the risk is limited to the original investment. With options,
investors have the possibility to engage in the obligation to buy or to sell, which
gives an unlimited risk. With this as a given, banks hope to convince investors
who do not want to participate on the “dangerous” options exchange”. Sem
van Berkel, an important trader on Euronext Amsterdam, in the magazine for
the options exchange, Rokin 5, already made a similar statement in 1995. Van
Berkel wrote (translated): “Warrants go better with the smart set than options.
You can explain as often as you like that options are used to hedge risks, but you
still often hear that clients have heard or read something about them that they
don’t like. It is different with warrants. Apparently it sounds less spooky”. The
issuing banks also actively try to establish a different image for call warrants
compared to call options. In the Dutch financial newspaper, Het Financieele
Dagblad, of March 18, 2000, a manager of one of the warrant issuing banks
argues: “Warrants are for investors who find stocks too boring and options too
wild and complicated”. In this context it also has to be remarked that the issu-
ing banks actively advertise investing in warrants. According to Het Financieele
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Dagblad of January 24, 2002, Euronext Amsterdam was also going to start a
marketing campaign for investing in warrants. This was probably also caused
by the fact that the exchange generates revenues from warrant trading
30
. Since
there is hardly any advertising for options, the large popularity of warrants
may also partly be explained by the active marketing of this financial product.
Hirshleifer (2001) argues that person-to-person and media contagion of ideas is
important. He argues that people tend to conform to the judgments and be-
haviors of others. At least two of the large banks that are active in the Dutch
warrant market are very active in organizing seminars. They both organize
their own seminars and they give lectures at investment clubs and at the major
exchange “Geldzaken” (“Money affairs”) that is held annually in the Nether-
lands. Such places are excellent sources for the contagion of ideas. We consider
the combination of financial marketing and the framing by financial institutions
to be the most probable explanation for the overpricing of call warrants in rela-
tion to call options. The issuing parties on the warrant market apparently have
managed to create an image for call warrants that is different from the image
of call options. After the first group of individual investors adopted this new
instrument, it most likely spread to other individual investors, thereby creating
a niche for call warrants as a unique financial instrument.
7. Summary and conclusions
Since 1998 the European capital markets have witnessed a large growth in the
number of issues of call warrants. These call warrants are issued by a small
number of large investment banks. We study the pricing of call warrants in the
Dutch capital market. The reason to choose the Dutch market is that the options
exchange in Amsterdam also features the trading of long-term call options. This
allows us to price the call warrants contingent on the pricing of these call options.
We first find a number of cases in which call options with the same exercise
price, but with a longer maturity, are priced lower than call warrants written
on the same stock. This picture is confirmed when we use implied standard
deviations from call options in order to price call warrants. In this analysis
we find that on the first five trading days, more than 99% of the warrants are
strongly overvalued. Only a small part of the overpricing can be attributed to
rational factors. For example, we find that the transaction costs are lower for
call warrants that are relatively cheap compared to other call warrants with the
same warrant ratio. However, we also find that this argument only applies to
a small part of our sample. Besides that, even in the most extreme cases, the
transaction cost difference can only explain an overpricing of 6-7%, while the
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average overpricing is 25-30%. The lack of arbitrage possibilities explains that
the overpricing cannot be arbitraged away. However, this still leaves us with
the question why investors are willing to pay more for call warrants than for
almost identical call options. We suggest that the answer lies in a combination
of financial marketing and framing. Apparently, the different way in which the
issuing institutions have framed call warrants compared to call options has led
to a different image for call warrants. This image may be responsible for the
overpricing of call warrants in relation to call options.
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Notes
1
See, e.g., Chen et al. (1992), and Wei (1992).
2
See De Roon and Veld (1996).
3
Source: the Dutch financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad of January 24, 2002.
4
Euronext Brussels, Amsterdam, and Paris are the respective stock exchanges of Brussels,
Amsterdam, and Paris that merged into Euronext.
5
Bartram and Fehle (2004) argue that regulatory differences could be one of the reasons
why bank-issued option markets are virtually non-existent in the United States.
6
See, e.g. Galai (1977).
7
The reason for this is that the exchange does not allow short positions in call warrants.
8
FALCONS is an abbreviation of “Fixed Term Agreements for Long Term Call Options
on Existing Securities”.
9
EAGLES is an abbreviation of “Euro-issued American-style Geared Letters Exchangeable
for Shares”.
10
See Duffhues and Veld (1997) for an overview.
11
This rule was first developed by Merton (1973) and can be found in any option pricing
textbook, see e.g. Hull (2006).
12
See e.g. Shastri and Sirodom (1995), Lauterbach and Schultz (1990), and Hauser and
Lauterbach (1996, 1997). A complete overview of empirical research on warrant pricing can
be found in Veld (2003).
13
An important difference between traditional warrants and call warrants is that the exercise
of a traditional warrant leads to the creation of new shares. Research of Schulz and Trautmann
(1994) has shown that this effect can be ignored when pricing traditional warrants.
14
See e.g. Hull (2006, page 296) for a justification of this estimate of the risk-free interest
rate. A number of other option pricing studies use the same estimate, see e.g. Roberts et al.
(2002).
15
In reality dividend payments show a growing pattern. However, it is difficult to derive an
objective growth rate for the dividend payment. We have experimented with several growth
rates and we find that our results are fairly robust if we use a growth rate instead of a constant
dividend payment. These results are on request available from the authors.
16
This so-called smile effect has been studied extensively. See e.g. Pena et al. (2001) for a
study on Spanish index options and Navatte and Villa (2000) and Perignon and Villa (2002)
for studies on French index options.
17
The sub-sample includes the warrants for which, on at least one of the five trading days,
at least four options are available.
18
The significance of the medians is tested using the Binomial sign test.
19
Results for the model of Black and Scholes and the Binomial model on the level of the
underlying stocks, like the ones presented for the Square Root model, are on request available
from the authors.
20
Detailed results are, on request, available from the authors.
21
See Ritter (2003) for an overview of this literature.
22
Reverse convertible bonds are bonds that can be exchanged into shares of common stock at
the option of the issuer. In fact, they are bonds with written put options. Discount certificates
are securities in which the holder acquires a bundle of shares at a “discount” compared to the
current market price. At the maturity date, these shares are delivered to the holder if the
total value of the shares does not exceed a pre-specified maximum amount. Otherwise, the
certificate pays this in amount in cash.
23
Detailed results for the Black and Scholes model and the Binomial models are, on request,
available from the authors.
23
24
We have also made calculations for all individual banks and/or brokers. These results
are, on request, available from the authors.
25
These results are available on request from the authors.
26
The Internet company Belegger.nl does not give information on warrant orders smaller
than 1,000 Euros. It may be possible that the transaction cost differences are larger for such
orders. However, it will still not explain the full price difference between call warrants and
call options.
27
Private conversation with one of the warrant-issuing banks revealed that most of the times
the bank is the counter party of the investor in the secondary market. It also revealed that
the bid-ask spreads of the issuing banks are worse than those of the options exchange.
28
See e.g. Het Financieele Dagblad of June 20, 1998: “Beurshausse leidt tot te dure warrants
(transl. Bull markets leads to overpriced warrants)” and Het Financieele Dagblad of June 16,
2001: “Warrant belegger moet op kleintjes letten (transl. Warrant investor has to take care
of the pences)”.
29
According to a person from one of the warrant issuing banks, individual investors make
up far more than 90% of the market for call warrants.
30
The exchange collects 1,000 Euro per listed warrant, and 500 Euro for each year that
the warrant is listed. Besides that, the exchange collects 5 Eurocents for each price change.
Finally, the exchange collects transaction costs from parties that buy warrants.
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Figure 1: Comparison of prices.
A comparison of the prices of the call warrants on the first five trading days of Ahold
with exercise price € 37 and exercise date August 2, 2002 to the call options Ahold
with exercise price € 37 and exercise date October 18, 2002.
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Figure 2: Overpricing of the call warrants during their maturity.
This figure presents the average overpricing of Dutch call warrants issued between
January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001 during their maturity. The call warrants
and the underlying stocks are identified from the official newspaper of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, De Officiële Prijscourant van de Effectenbeurs. The overpricing is
defined as the difference between the market price of the warrant and the model price
divided by the market price. Model prices are calculated using the Square Root version
of the Constant Elasticity of Variance model of Cox and Ross (1976) corrected for
continuous dividend payments. The price of the underlying stock, the exercise price,
the dividend yield, and the time to maturity of both the options and the warrants
are derived from Datastream. The risk-free interest rate is estimated as the average
yield on government bonds with a maturity of 2 years (also from Datastream). The
volatility of the warrants is defined as the implied volatility of long term call options
on the same stocks. The different implied volatilities are weighted in such a way that
the options that are closest to the call warrants in terms of exercise price and time to
maturity get the highest weight. The graph only includes information on warrants that
are actually traded on a certain day. For example, the information on day 50 includes
the average overpricing of all call warrants that were traded, i.e. for which there was
a positive trading volume, on the 50th day after their issuance. Call warrants are only
taken into account if they fulfill all four of the following conditions: (1) The trading
volume of the warrant is positive; (2) There are at least two call options on the same
underlying stock that have a positive trading volume: one with a longer maturity and
one with a shorter maturity; (3) The overpricing is not more than 150%; (4) The price
of the call warrant is at least 0.10 euro.
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Table 1:
Sample selection.
This table presents the selection of call warrants for our sample. The call warrants
and the underlying stocks are identified from the official newspaper of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, De Officiële Prijscourant van de Effectenbeurs. Column (1) presents
the underlying stocks. Column (2) presents all the call warrants that were issued
on Euronext Amsterdam in the period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001
on underlying shares on which also long-term call options are available. Column (3)
gives the call warrants for which there is no price information available in Datastream.
The call warrants that are eliminated because there is conflicting information between
different data sources are included in column (4). Call warrants for which we do not
have at least five trading days available are presented in column (5). Column (6) gives
the call warrants for which it is not possible to find at least five days during the first
ten trading days of the call warrant on which not at least both a call option with a
longer maturity and a call option with a shorter maturity are being traded. Finally,
column (7) gives the final sample.
Underlying Original No price Conflicting Less than Not enough Final
stock sample information issuance 5 trading options sample
in information days available
Datastream
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ABN Amro 18 3 2 13
Aegon 17 3 6 8
Ahold 11 1 1 9
Akzo 12 2 2 8
ASML 25 5 8 12
DSM 5 1 1 3
Elsevier 15 1 2 1 11
Fortis 13 2 3 5 3 0
Getronics 23 2 6 7 8
Heineken 8 3 5 0
ING 22 4 2 1 5 10
KPN 26 22 4
Numico 13 2 1 8 2
Philips 24 5 1 9 9
Royal Dutch 13 2 1 2 8
TNT Post 4 1 3 0
Unilever 5 5
UPC 15 2 5 7 1
Wolters Kluwer 6 6 0
Total 275 35 5 28 96 111
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Table 2:
Summary statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the Dutch call warrants issued between
January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001. Call warrants are only included if they are at
least traded during five trading days (these are days with a positive trading volume).
Trading days are only taken into account if at least one call option with a longer
maturity and one call option with a shorter maturity than the warrant are traded.
Furthermore, call warrants are only included if during the first 10 trading days at
least five days can be found on which the earlier mentioned two options are traded.
The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identified from the official newspaper
of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Officiele Prijscourant van de Effectenbeurs.
The normalized call warrant price represents the price to buy 0.1 share of common
stock. The warrant ratio is the number of shares that can be bought with one call
warrant. The moneyness is the ratio of the stock price and the exercise price on the
first trading date. The price of the underlying stock, the exercise price, the time to
maturity, the trading volume of the warrants, the warrant price and the warrant ratio
are derived from Datastream. Issuer A refers to the only Dutch issuing bank (ABN
Amro). Issuers B, C, and D refer to the foreign issuers. The information on the
full sample is presented in Panel A. In Panel B information is presented on the call
warrants that are priced using four call options.
Panel A : full sample Issuer
A B C D Total
Number of warrants 26 32 41 12 111
Avg. warrant price (norm) 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.69 0.55
Med. warrant price (norm) 0.51 0.44 0.4 0.68 0.47
Avg. maturity 1.41 1.68 2.02 1.33 1.71
Med. Maturity 1.48 1.78 1.65 1.41 1.58
Avg. warrant ratio 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.13
Med. warrant ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Avg. trading volume 6516 5966 9717 6314 7518
Med. trading volume 4000 4179 5280 2883 4000
Avg. moneyness 0.9 0.87 0.8 0.89 0.85
Panel B : valuation based on 4 options Issuer
A B C D Total
Number of warrants 13 19 21 6 59
Avg. warrant price (norm) 0.46 0.55 0.65 0.87 0.6
Med. warrant price (norm) 0.36 0.45 0.65 0.76 0.53
Avg. maturity 1.4 1.7 1.95 1.25 1.67
Med. Maturity 1.39 1.84 1.65 1.38 1.6
Avg. warrant ratio 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.12
Med. warrant ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Avg. trading volume 11133 5044 6654 6638 7121
Med. trading volume 7857 4160 3920 2767 4160
Avg. moneyness 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.97 0.88
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Table 3:
Overpricing of the Dutch call warrants for the Square Root model.
This table presents the overpricing of the Dutch call warrants issued between January
1, 1999 and December 31, 2001. The overpricing is calculated as the average overpric-
ing over the first five trading days of the warrants. Trading days are only taken into
account if at least one call option with a longer maturity and one call option with a
shorter maturity than the warrant are traded. Warrants are only included if during
the first 10 trading days at least five days can be found on which the earlier mentioned
two options are traded. The call warrants and the underlying stocks are identified
from the official newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De Officiële Prijscour-
ant van de Effectenbeurs. The overpricing is defined as the difference between the
market price of the warrant and the model price divided by the market price. Model
prices are calculated using the Square Root version of the Constant Elasticity of Vari-
ance model of Cox and Ross (1976) corrected for continuous dividend payments. The
price of the underlying stock, the exercise price, the dividend yield, and the time to
maturity of both the options and the warrants are derived from Datastream. The
risk-free interest rate is estimated as the average yield on government bonds with a
maturity of 2 years (also from Datastream). The volatility of the warrants is defined
as the implied volatility of long term call options on the same stocks. The different
implied volatilities are weighted in such a way that the options that are closest to the
call warrants in terms of exercise price and time to maturity get the highest weight.
The information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In Panel B information is
presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call options. The significance
of the averages is tested using a t-statistic. The significance of the medians is tested
using the Binomial sign test. *** = significant at the 1%-level; ** = significant at the
5%-level; * = significant at the 10%-level.
Panel A : full sample
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 13 38.76*** 32.19 3.27 117.02 28.97*** 13
Aegon 8 35.75*** 16.4 19.13 65.06 27.56*** 8
Ahold 9 44.88*** 44.31 8.84 152.73 31.07*** 9
Akzo 8 38.08*** 29.34 3.28 93.84 35.29*** 8
ASML 12 27.58*** 16.95 8.45 71.15 23.93*** 12
DSM 3 12.87* 12.05 -0.57 22.71 16.47 2
Elsevier 11 45.16*** 42.17 5.02 157.5 33.94*** 11
Getronics 8 41.50*** 38.93 17.81 134.17 26.60*** 8
ING 10 30.80*** 14.79 10.09 51.74 30.81*** 10
KPN 4 35.17*** 22.92 13.06 61.03 33.29 4
Numico 2 98.26** 68.75 49.65 146.87 98.26 2
Philips 9 37.83*** 19.49 15.84 71.35 39.79*** 9
Royal Dutch 8 36.26*** 34.46 6.04 114.61 28.55*** 8
Unilever 5 30.19*** 16.49 6.51 46.61 34.77** 5
UPC 1 20.59 20.59 20.59 20.59 1
Total 111 38.25*** 4.84 -0.57 157.5 29.65*** 110
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Panel B : valuation based on 4 options
Stock war. Average St.dev. Min. Max. Med. pos.
ABN Amro 9 24.30*** 10.5 3.27 35.78 26.41*** 9
Aegon 6 36.65*** 17.17 24.2 65.06 27.56** 6
Ahold 3 18.65*** 12.32 8.84 32.47 14.65 3
Akzo
ASML 11 28.44*** 17.5 8.45 71.16 27.55*** 11
DSM
Elsevier 3 26.52*** 9.38 15.98 33.94 29.41 3
Getronics 5 50.38** 47.95 18.67 134.17 29.61** 5
ING 5 26.15*** 16.47 10.09 51.74 20.12** 5
KPN 4 35.17*** 22.92 13.06 61.03 33.29 4
Numico
Philips 5 33.50*** 12.77 16.83 47.36 39.79** 5
Royal Dutch 2 28.55*** 4.89 25.1 32.01 28.55 2
Unilever 5 30.19*** 16.49 6.51 46.61 34.77** 5
UPC 1 20.59 20.59 20.59 20.59 1
Total 59 29.92*** 2.43 3.27 134.17 27.55*** 59
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Table 4:
Regression results.
This table presents the regression analysis of the overpricing of the Dutch call warrants
issued between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2001. The overpricing is calculated
as the average overpricing over the first five trading days of the warrants. Trading days
are only taken into account if at least one call option with a longer maturity and one
call option with a shorter maturity than the warrant are traded. Warrants are only
included if, during the first 10 trading days, at least five days can be found on which
the earlier mentioned two options are traded. The call warrants and the underlying
stocks are identified from the official newspaper of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, De
Officiële Prijscourant van de Effectenbeurs. The overpricing is defined as the difference
between the market price of the warrant and the model price divided by the market
price. Model prices in Panels A and B are calculated using the Square Root version
of the Constant Elasticity of Variance model of Cox and Ross (1976), corrected for
continuous dividend payments. The price of the underlying stock, the exercise price,
the dividend yield, and the time to maturity of both the options and the warrants
are derived from Datastream. The risk-free interest rate is estimated as the average
yield on government bonds with a maturity of 2 years (also from Datastream). The
volatility of the warrants is defined as the implied volatility of long term call options
on the same stocks. The different implied volatilities are weighted in such a way that
the options that are closest to the call warrants in terms of exercise price and time
to maturity get the highest weight. The normalized call warrant price represents the
price to buy 0.1 share of common stock. The warrant ratio is the number of shares
that can be bought with one call warrant. The moneyness (M.ness) is the ratio of
the stock price and the exercise price on the first trading date. The warrant-ratio
and the trading volume of the warrants are also derived from Datastream. Issuer
A refers to the only Dutch issuing bank (ABN Amro). Issuers B, C and D refer to
the foreign issuers. The information on the full sample is presented in Panel A. In
Panels B information is presented on the call warrants that are priced using four call
options. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (White) are reported between
square brackets. *** = significant at the 1%-level; ** = significant at the 5%-level; *
= significant at the 10%-level.
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Panel A: dependent variable : % overpricing (Square Root model warrant prices)
obs : 111
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.561 -0.341 0.16
Std. Err. [0.065] [0.078]
t-test 8.63*** -4.37***
Coef. 0.606 -0.362 -0.247 0.17
Std. Err. [0.075] [0.083] [0.131]
t-test 8.08*** -4.36*** -1.89*
Coef. 0.191 0.102 0.376 0.134 0.26
Std. Err. [0.019] [0.031] [0.064] [0.057]
t-test 10.05*** 3.29*** 5.88*** 2.35**
Coef. 1.481 -1.299 0.42
Std. Err. [0.196] [0.211]
t-test 7.56*** -6.16***
Coef. 0.143 0.034 0.14
Std. Err. [0.040] [0.008]
t-test 3.58*** 4.25***
Coef. 0.995 -0.113 -0.136 0.054 0.279 0.153 -0.861 0.009 0.56
Std. Err. [0.157] [0.063] [0.106] [0.033] [0.043] [0.046] [0.191] [0.005]
t-test 6.33*** -1.81* -1.29 1.64 6.44*** 3.30*** -4.49*** 1.91*
Panel B: dependent variable : % overpricing (Square Root model warrant prices)
obs : 59
Indep. Interc. Price War. Issuer M.ness Ln(vol) R2
Var. (norm) Ratio B C D
Coef. 0.387 -0.134 0.06
Std. Err. [0.059] [0.067]
t-test 6.56*** -2.00**
Coef. 0.43 -0.142 -0.334 0.07
Std. Err. [0.074] [0.068] [0.198]
t-test 5.81*** -2.09** -1.69*
Coef. 0.23 0.014 0.197 0.02 0.21
Std. Err. [0.020] [0.031] [0.061] [0.048]
t-test 11.50*** 0.45 3.23*** 0.42
Coef. 0.965 -0.75 0.27
Std. Err [0.286] [0.309]
t-test 3.37*** -2.43**
Coef. 0.206 0.014 0.05
Std. Err [0.055] [0.009]
t-test 3.75*** 1.56
Coef. 0.726 -0.070 -0.271 0.011 0.199 0.132 -0.566 0.009 0.47
Std. Err [0.236] [0.061] [0.247] [0.035] [0.047] [0.148] [0.262] [0.007]
t-test 3.07*** -1.14 -1.10 0.32 4.25*** 1.64 -2.16** 1.30
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Table 5:
Transaction costs for call warrants and call options.
Transaction costs (in Euro) for call warrants and call options are presented for four
different scenarios for the warrant price. In all scenarios it is assumed that an investor
purchases call warrants for a total value of 1,000 Euro. The warrant price scenarios
are included in column (1). The average transaction costs of warrants based on eight
different banks and brokers are included in columns (2) and (3). Each warrant entitles
her to buy 0.1 shares of common stock. It is also assumed that the investor buys
call options that entitle her to buy the same number of shares. In the first scenario
(row 1) the warrant price is 0.1 Euro. Therefore, the investor buys 10,000 warrants.
A similar position can be acquired by buying 10 option contracts (each allowing her
to buy 100 shares). The option transaction costs of the first scenario are included in
columns (4) and (5). In the second scenario (row 2) the warrant price is 0.2 Euro,
allowing the investor to buy 5,000 warrants. The transaction costs are the same as
in the first scenario and are included in columns (2) and (3). An equivalent position
can be acquired by buying 5 option contracts. The transaction costs for the position
are included in columns (4) and (5) of the second scenario. In the third scenario (row
3) the warrant price is 0.5 Euro. In this case an equivalent position can be taken by
buying 2 option contracts. Finally, in the fourth scenario (row 4) the warrant price
is 1 Euro. Here an equivalent position can be acquired by buying 1 option contract.
In the third and the fourth scenario the transaction costs for the option contracts are
included in columns (4) and (5). Columns (6) and (7) in each scenario present the
difference in transaction costs expressed in the price per warrant. Columns (8) and
(9) give this difference as a percentage of the warrant price. The transaction costs are
the averages of the transaction costs of eight different banks and brokers, which are
derived from the Internet company "Belegger.nl" on February 19, 2002. P = phone
trade. I = Internet trade.
Warrant Transaction Transaction Difference Difference
price costs costs per warrant per warrant
warrants options (in Euros) (percentage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.1 15.6 12 52.6 42.8 0.0074 0.0062 7.4 6.2
0.2 15.6 12 27.9 22.7 0.0049 0.0043 2.5 2.1
0.5 15.6 12 15.7 13.3 0.0001 0.0013 0.0 0.7
1.0 15.6 12 14.3 11.8 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.3 0.0
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